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1 Introduction
In the neoclassical theory of economic growth, as expounded by Solow
(1956), Swan (1956) and Cass (1965), the long-run growth rate of national
income is driven by population growth and exogenous labour-augmenting
technical progress. An exogenous increase in growth implies a deferral of
private consumptioa, so households must be compensated with a higher re-
turn on assets. This is achieved through a higher marginal productivity of
capital, which requires a fall in the capital-output ratio. This is why neoclas-
sical growth theory predicts that out of steady state poor countries grow at
a faster rate than rich countries. After three decades of neoclassical growth
theory without production externalities, an exciting new brand of theories
has emerged which tackle old questions to do with the effects of policy on
economic growth with modern tools.
The new theories of endogenous economic growth, starting from Romer
(1986), take account of the stylistic fact that the capital-output ratio is
relatively constant, as in Kaldor (1957), and assume that production is pro-
portiona! to a broad measure ot the capital stock. In these theories the
marginal productivity of capital, the market rate of interest and thue the
growth rate of the economy are affected by production externalities such as
learning by doing, RBcD and the fraction of national income spent on infras-
tructure, but they are not influenced by macrceconomic budgetary policies
flUCh as tax-financed or bond.financ~d chang~s in govcrnmcnt consumption
or intertemporal shifts in lump-sum taxation. 1'he reason is that the new
theories of economic growth assume infinitely-lived households or dynasties
with a fully operative intergenerational beyuest motive and thux imply Ri-
cardian debt neutrality. This is an unnecessarily restrictive framework for
analysing macrceconomic policy. Hence, the objective of this paper is to
analyse the effects ot budgetary policies on economic growth and crowding
out ofprivate consumption in a world populated by non-interconnected over-
lapping generations of households and in particulat to analyse the burden
of govermeat debt in such a world.
Section 2 sete up a model of a closed economy with overlapping genera-
tions and endogenous growth. There is no intergenerational bequest motive
and the birth of new generations allows for departures from Ricardian debt
neutrality. At an economy-wide level output is proportional to a broad mea-
sure of the capital stock; individual firms face constant returns to scale with
respect to their capital stock, the capital stock oí their competitors and the
stock of social infraatructure. Section 3 shows that a tax-financed increase2
in the government debt-GUP reduces the growth rate of the economy, but
increases the private consumption-GDP ratio. This ie Lhe opposite to what
happene in modP.le of economies with overlappinggenerations and exogerious
growth, in which an increase in government debt crowds out the steady-etate
level of private consnmption. The reason for this difference is that in models
with exogenous growth there is a decreasing mazginal productivity of cap-
ital, so that the reduction of the capital stock associated with an increase
in government debt causes a rise in the equilibrium real interest rate which
depresses private consumption. However, in a model of endogenous growth
neither the marginal productivity of capital nor the interest rate are affected
following a rise in govenrment debt. Section 3 also considers the effects of an
increase in population growth and of tax-financed increases in the fractions
of national income devoted to private consumption and to social infrastruc-
ture on private coneumption, savings and the growth rate of the economy.
Section 4 considers the effects of intertemporal shifts in budgetary policy.
For example, a cut in taxes followed by gradual increasea in taxes as govern-
ment debt rises in such a way as to satisfy the government's present-value
constraint, leads to an instantaneous reduction in the growth rate followed
by future reductions in growth. Section 4 also argues that a bond-financed
increase in government conaumption damages growtL prospects more than a
tax-financed increase. Section 5 showa that the mere presence of adjustment
costs for investment reduces interest rates and growth rates. Adjustment
costs make the mazket interest rate endogenous and increase with the ahare
of government consumption and government debt. Section 6 allows for the
presence of dietortionary taxation, which relaxee debt neutrality even when
thcre is no entry of new non-interconnectexl generations of houecholde and
allows for one to determine the optimal share of infraetructure and growth
rate as decreasing functions of the ahaze of government conaumption. Sec-
tion 7 concludes with a summary of the results and suggestione for future
research.3
2 A model of endogenous growth and overlap-
ping generations
2.1 The individual's conaumption behaviour and aggregation
The economy consists of a population ot households which grows at tàe rate
n. There ia a positive birth rate (3 and a constant probability of death a, so
that n- p- a. Households have no intergenerational bequest motive, so
Ricardian debt neutrality (Bazro, 1974) dces not hold. The model incorpo-
rates the uncertain lifetimes approach of Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985),
where it is assumed that there is no population growth (p - a, n- 0). How-
ever, Weil (1985) has ehown that what matters for the non-neutrality of debt
finance is that the households ofdifferent generations are not interconnected.
Strictly speaking, it is thus not necessazy to have finite lifetimes in order to
depart from Ricardian debt neutrality ((i - n,a - 0). Buiter (1988) has
also shown that what matters is a positive birth rate, as only then can one
pass the burden on to new, yet unborn generations, and our formulation of
aggregate consumption behaviour is based on his model.
A household born at time x solves at time t the following problem:
,
Max ~~ ex ~ v- t c(x' v)~-o- dv, 0 1
a(: „) ~ PI-(P f)( )] 1- a-1 ~
subject to the household's instantaneous flow budget identity
dá(x,t)
-~r(t) t a]á(x,t) t J(x,t) - T(x,t) - c(x,t) dt
(1)
(2)
where p denotes the pure rate of time preference, o denotes the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution, r(t) denotes the mazket rate of interest at
time t, and c(x, t), á(x, t),j(s, t) and r(x, t) denote at time t the levela of
consumption, non-human wealth, income and lump-sum taxes (net of trans-
fers) of a household born at time x, respectively. The effective discount rate
in (1) is augmented by the probability of death. The term aá is an actu-
azially fair life ineurance premium, so that when honseholds are alive they
receive a return a on their assets and when they die the estate accrues to4
the insurance company. This set-up corresponda to a competitive inaurance
induatry with free entry. When one requirea householda to be solvent and in
addition asaumes a time-invariant intereat rate (aee Section 2.2), one obtaina
the individual household's consumption function:
c(z, t) - [o(p -{- a) -(o - 1)(r } a)]{á(z, t)
f r~ exp[-(r t a)(v - t)][j(x, v) - i(z, v)]dv}.
Je
(3)
Total wealth conaiats of non-human wealth plus the preaent value of future
income minua the present value of future tax liabilitiee, i.e. human wealth.
The marginal propensity to consume out of total wealth increases (decreases)
with the market rate ot intereat when the elasticity of intertemporal substi-
tution is less than (exceeds) unity, becauae then the income effect dominates
(is less than) the subatitution effect.
Each houaehold pays the same taxes irrespective of how old it ie, r(x, t) -
T(t). The fraction of the cohort born at time x which ie atill alive at time t ia
pL(x)ezp[-a(t - z}] - Aexp(Ax)exp(-at), where L(z) - exp(nx) denotes
the size of the population at time x. This can be used to define population
aggregatea, say C(t) -,Oexp(-at) ft~ c(s, t)exp(~ix)dx. Using the fact that
newly born households do not inherit any wealth, one obtains:
C(t) - [o(r - p) ~ n]C(t) - p[a ~ op ~ (1 - o)r]A(t) (4)
f1(t) - rA(i) f J(t) - T(t) - C(i). (5)
Population growth appears in (4), because (4) refers to aggregate conaump-
tion. There is no inaurance premium in (5), because these conatitute a
tranafer from those who die to those who aurvive and thus dcea not affect
the aggregate return on assets.
2.2 Production and behaviour of Rrma
The economy consists of a large number of competitive firms who maximise
their net worth. Following the recent literature on endogenous growth, for5
example Romer (1986; 1989; 1990), Lucas (1988), Grossman and Helpman
(1989), King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988), Rebelo (1990), Bean (1990), Bazro
(1990) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990), it is aasumed that technology is
linear in a broad measure ofthe wpital stock. To be apecific, the production
function of the repreaentative firm is of the Cobb-Douglas variety and is
given by:
Y(t) - Bsa(t)K(t)yK(t)'-"-', a,7 ? 0, a i- ry 5 1, (6)
where Y(t), K(t), K(t) and S(t) denote the level of production, the own
capital stock, the average capital stock for the whole economy and public
apending on social infrastructure at time t, reapectively. Production exhibita
constant returns to scale with respect to K, ÍC and S. If a f ry is leas than
unity, there ia learning by doing as in Anow (1962) and Romer (1986) be-
cause then knowledge or ideas from one producer (Íf) spill over and increase
the production of other producers (Y). If a is positive, individual producers
benefit from certain publicly-provided private goods, as in Barro (1990) and
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990), which may be referred to as social infras-
tructure. Theae two production externalitiea cause the social rate of return
to exceed the private rate of return. The representative producer can bor-
row or lend at the market rate of interest and maximiaes the present value
ofits net revenues:
Mla.~J~[BS(v)'K(v)'K(v)~-'-' - ÍC(v) - 6K(v)]exp[- I r(u)du]dv (7)
where ó denotea the depreciation rate of the phyaical capital stock. The
representative firm thus sets the marginal productivity of its capital stock,
,OB(S~K)a(K~K)1-"-7, equal to the user cost of capital, which conaiats of
the rental charge plus the depreciation charge, r~ 6. In symmetric equilib-
rium, one has
r - ryBó ( S ~-o (8)
`Y~ - ó.
The marginal productivity of private capital and thus the market rate of6
intereet increase with the share of govemment spending on inlrastructure
in the national income and decrease with the extent of learning by doing,
1- ry. Since only permanent, previously anticipated changes in the national
income ahare of infraetructure are considered, the market rate of interest is
time-invariant as was already assumed in Section 2.1.
~om (6) and (8) it follows that (r~6)K(t) - ryY(t) C Y(t), so that the
national income exceeds the return on private capital. Learning by doing
and apill-wers from knowledge of other firme in the economy induce aome
additional income for which individual firms do not need to pay. These
profits are handed over to the ownera of the firms in a manner which does
not depend on their age, so that J(t) -(1 - ry)Y(t).
The Appendix discussea an alternative formulation of endogenoua growth,
which pays explicit attention to investment in physical capital and in knowl-
edge.
2.3 The government
The government finances public consumption, G, social infrastructure, S,
and interest on the public debt, rD, by either taxation, T, or public bor-
rowing, D. This gives rise to the flow budget identity of the government:
D(t) - rD(t) f G(i) } S(t) - T(t) (9)
where D denotes the stock of government debt. Solvency of the government
requires that the present value of future public conaumption and infrastruc-
ture plus public debt must not exceed the present value of future taxes:
h exp[-r(v - t)][G(v) ~ S(v)]dv f D(t) G r~ exp[-r(v - t)]T(v)dv. (9')
e .le
In order to ensure solvency of the government's finances, it is neceaeary to
specify a tax rule which arrests the explosion of government debt. Here it
is assumed that the tax-GDP ratio increases with the debt-GDP ratio:
T(t) - roY(t) f r1D(t), (10)7
where rn denotee the autonomous component of the tax rate. To ensure
eolvency, r~ must be greater than the growth-corrected intereat rate.
2.4 Equilibrium in product and labour markete
The asaet menu of houaeholds consiats of private capital and government
debt, so A- K f D. Conaolidation of the household's and government's
flow budget identitiea, (5) and (9), yielda the flow budget identity for the
economy as a whole:
K(t) - rK(t) t (1 - ry)Y(t) - C(t) - G(t) - S(t). (11)
With the aid of (8), one obtains the condition for equilibrium in the gooda
market:
Y(t) - C(t) ~ G(t) f S(t) t K(t) ~ 6K(t). (11')
Labour supply is a constant fraction of the population and equilibrium in
the labour mazket enaures that all supply ie employed. If growth in the level
of national income is defined as ~(t) - Y(t)~Y(t), then the endogenous
rate of labour-augmenting technical progresa is defined ae x(t) -~(t) - n.
Alternatively, x(t) denotes the per-capita growth rate.
2.5 Summary
Since the naeional income shares of government coneumption, aocial infrae-
tructure and taxea aze asaumed to be time-invaziant, it is convenient to
reformulate the model in fractiona of national income. These fractions are
denoted by lower-case rather than capital lettera (e.g. c(t) - C(t)~Y(t)).
The model can then be expreased in terma of two differential equatíona for
the conaumption-GDP ratio and the government debt-GDP ratio:
é(t) - [o(r - p) - x(t)]c(t) - (n } a)[op ~ (1 - o)r f a)][k ~ d(t)] (12)8
d(t) -[r - x(t) - n- rl]d(t) f g f a- ro, d(0) - do (13)
where r- ry(9aa)1 - 6, k-(Bao)-(1) and
x(t)-(Ba') á[I-c(t)-g-s]-ó-n. (14)
Note that as e is time-invariant, k is time-invariant and thus w - x~~ de-
notes the common growth rate in output, capital and social infrastructure.
In fact, g is time-invariant so w also denotes the growth rate in government
consumption. Equation (14) may be recognised as the Harrod-Domaz (HD)
rule familiaz from the old literature on economic growth. It says that the
growth rate plus the depreciation rate (w f à) should equal the average
propensity to save divided by the exogenous capital-output ratio. Alterna-
tively, (14) may be viewed as the condition for equiGbrium in the product
market.
There are three distortions in this economy: (i) absence of an intergen-
erational bequest motive and the arrival of future, yet unborn generations;
(ii) the presence ot learning by doing and the spill-over of knowledge from
one firm to another; and (iii) the presence of a public goods called social in-
frastructure, which benefits production ot all firms in the economy. Section
6 discusses a tourth distortion associated with the taxation of income.
3 The burden of government debt
In a world in which Ricardian debt neutrality holds, government debt dces
not affect real outcomes or economic growth and thus the burden of debt
is zero. To see thie, assume a zero birth rate (A - n-E a- 0) so that it is
not possible to pass the burden of government debt to future, yet unborn
generations. In that case, there aze no tranaitional dynamics azising from
changes in the debt-GDP ratio and the Ramsey rule gives a positive rela-
tionship between the growth rate and the interest rate. Upon substitution
ot (8) into (12), one obtains the Ramsey-Romer (RR) rule:
x- o(r - p) - o[ry(Ba")~ - ó- pJ. (15)9
Hence, the endogenous rate of per-capita growth increases with the elaatic-
ity of intertemporal aubetitution (o), the share of social inírastructure in
the national income (s) and the exogenoue component of productivity (B)
but decreasea with the extent of learning by doing (1- y), the depreciation
rate (6) and the pure rate of time preference (p). If the birth rate ia zero,
the endogenoue rate of per-capita growth doea not depend on population
growth (n), the debt-GDP ratio (d) or the fraction of national income de-
voted to public conaumption (g). The interpretation of eqnation (15) ia that
a higher growth rate implies that households must be compensated for de-
ferring consumption, more so if the elasticity of intertemporal subatitution
ie high. In order to determine the private conaumption-GDP ratio, it is
necessazy to consider the HD rule as well. The intersection of the HD rule
and the RR rule yields the equilibrium level of c(Er in Figure 1). A per-
manent increase in the fraction oí national income devoted to government
consumption leads to 100o!'u crowding out of private conaumption, so that
the resourcea left for inveatment and growth prospects aze unaffected. An
increase in population growth depreasea the private consumption-GDP ratio,
but raises the growth rate in national income one-for-one as in the old lit-
erature on growth. Spill-over effects of knowledge depress growth and raise
the private consumption-GDP ratio. All three ehifts can be represented by
a move from El to E~ in Figure 1. There clearly is no burden of government
debt when Ricazdian debt neutrality holds.
Insert: FIGURE 1: Endogenoue growth and government consumption
We next conaider departures from Ricardian debt neutrality by allowing for
a strictly positive birth rate. With a conatant government debt-GDP ratio,
c immediately jumps to its equilibrium value. This yielde the Blanchazd-
Romer (BR) rule:
~- (n t a){a toPt(1- Q)Iisa)á- 6J}[(B,Q)-(1) t d] (16)
` o~7(B9o)'-" - 6 - P~ - x
The BR rule approachea the RR rule asymptotically and ie upwazd-sloping.
The BR rules says that the ratio oí private consumption to income tends to
infinity as the growth rate approaches the modified golden (Ramsey-Romer)
rule trom below. The equilibrium where new generations are continuously10
being born, E3, yields a lower per-capita growth rate and a higher private
consumption-GDP ratiothan the equilibrium with a zero birth rate, Er. The
presence of future, yet unborn generations leads the current generation of
households to consume more than they would otherwise and, consequently,
the eavings rate and the growth rate are less than they would have been.
Now a permanent increase in government consumption leads to less than
10036 crowding out of privatc consumption, because the highcr taxee that
aze required in the future aze paztially shouldered by future, yet unborn gen-
erations. As a result there is less room fot private investment and thus the
growth rate falls (shift from E3 to E4). Figure 2 illustrates what happens
when there is an increase in the government debt-GDP ratio. Private con-
sumption rises, because households know that the burden of taxation will
partially fall on future, yet unborn, generations. As a result, the fraction of
national income devoted to savings and investment falls and, consequently,
the endogenous growth rate falls. Note that with Ricardian debt neutrality
the private consumption-GDP ratio is unchanged, so that the equilibrium
Eo and the growth rate aze unaffected.
An increase in population growth only leads to an equal increase in the
growth rate of national income when Ricatdian debt neutrality holds. In
general, depaztnres ftom debt neutrality imply depaztures from the results
familiar from classical growth theory. An increase in population growth
also shifts the equilibrium from El to Ez in Figure 2, so that the private
consumption-GDP ratio increases as taxea aze also ehouldered by future, yet
unborn generations and the per-capita growth rate falls. Hence, the growth
rate in national income does not rise by the full 10036 as in classical growth
theory.
An tax-financed increase in the share of national income devoted to
social infrastructure induces an increase in the marginal productivity of
capital and thus an increase in the interest rate and the required rate of
growth in private consumption. Hence, the RR and the BR rules shift to
the right. At the same time an increase in the share ofinfrastructure leaves
less resources for private investment thua depresses the rate of growth in
physical capital accumulation, so that the HD rule ahifts to the left. The shift
to the left ie attenuated, because the increase in the ehare of infrasttucture
reduces the capital-output ratio and thus boosts the rate of growth in capital
accumulation. The result of these shifts ie a fall in the private consumption-
GDP ratio and possibly an increase in the rate of growth.
Insert: FIGURE 2: The burden of government debtIl
4 Intertemporal shifts in budgetary policy and
endogenous growth
It is of some interest to investigate the dynamics of private conaumption
and government debt azising trom intertemporal shifts in budgetary policy.
Since attention is focused on the effects of a transitory tax cut which is
gradually revereed (cut in ro), nothing is lost by ignoring here the effects of
learning by doing and socialinfrastructure (ry - l,a - 0):
i(t) - Bc(t)~ ~ [Bg ~ n - op - (1 - o)(B - 6)]c(t)]
-(n t a)[ov t(1 - o)(B - 6) t a][(é) t d(t)] (12')
d(t) -{B[c(t) } g] - rl}d(t) f g- ro. (13')
The phase diagram aesociated with (12')-(13') is presented in Figure 3. It
is assumed that the government is solvent, whích is ensured through the
asaumption that ri ~ r- a- n - B(c ~- g), and has an autonomous primazy
deficit, ro C g, which implies that there is government debt in the steady
state. Attention is confined to equilibria with positive levels oí private con-
sumption.
The c- 0-locus slopes downwazda for low values of c, since a low share
of private consumption leaves more room for investment and means that the
growth rate is high enough to ensure that the growth-corrected interest rate
is less than the pure rate of time preference. It has a minimum value for d
at the point where consumption is high enough to ensure that investment
and gmwth are just low enough to ensure that the growth-corrected interest
rate exceeds the pure rate of time preference. To be precise, d is minimised
along the é-locus when c- zc' where c' - 1- o- g}[op -(1- o)b - n]~B
denotes the equilibrium share of private consumption in the national income
associated with the Ramsey-Romer rule. If c exceede sc", the é-locus slopes
upwards. Note that the Ramsey-Romer consumption-GDP ratio, c', is an
equilibrium in the model with overlapping generationa when the government
holds assets equal to the private capital stock, d--1~8.
The d- 0-locns slopes upwards as long as c does not exceed c" -
(r1~B) - g. There are three steady states. El can be niled out, because it
implies negative valuee of private consumption. Ez can be ruled out, because12
it ie unstable. It follows that E3 is the only meaningful steady atate for the
overlapping-gencrations modcl; it is eaiidlepoint etable which is sensible as d
is a predetermined variable and c is a non-predetermined variable. Eo is the
steady state of the infinite-hoiizon (Ramsey-Romer) model. Compazing E3
with Eo, one notes that the absence of an intergenerational bequest motive
leads to a higher private consumption-GDP ratio and a higher government
debt-GDP ratio, but to a lowet private investment-GDP ratio and a lower
rate of endogenous growth.
Insert: FIGURE 3: Dynamics of government debt and private consumption
Intertemporal shifts in taxation do not affect the private consumption-
GDP tatio in the model of endogenous growth with a zero birth rate. Be-
cause the Ramsey-Romer model implies Ricardian debt neutrality, intertem-
poral shifts in taxation on]y affect the government debt-GDP ratio (shifts
along RR in Figure 3). In the overlapping-generations model of endoge-
nous growth there aze real effects of a transitory tax cut followed by gradual
increases in taxation. A cut in ro shifts the d-locus to the right, so E3 cor-
responds to the steady state before the tax cut and E3 to the steady state
afterwards. The short-run effects imply an increase in private consumption
(move from E3 to A), because future taxes aze partially paid by future, yet
unborn generations. As a result, private investment and savings fall on im-
pact and thus the rate of economic growth falls on impact. Over time the
government deficit leads to an expansion oí government debt, which leads
to increases in the private consumption-GDP ratio (as government debt is
pazt of private wealth) and inducea gradual increases in taxation until the
new steady state is reached (move from A to E3 along the saddlepath, SS).
Over time, the share of investment in national income steadily falls and thus
the rate of growth declines along the adjustment path.
A bond-financed increase in government consumption (increase in g with
finite rl) may be viewed as the sum of a tax-financed increase in govern-
ment consumption and a temporazy tax cut followed by increases in taxes
as government debt rises over time. It follows that a bond-financed in-
crease in government consumption leads to a greater increase in the private
consumption-GDP ratio and a greater fall in the growth rate.
It is of some interest to discuss the effects of a"greying~ economy with
very little reproduction. Consider therefore what happens when the birth
rate abtuptly falls to zero. Population growth is then negative and equal
to the death rate. On impact private consumption falls and investment and13
the rate of growth of the economy increase to the Ramsey-Romer growth
rate (move from E3 to B). As a result, the growth-corrected interest rate
falls, debt aervice falls, the government haa a financial aurplus, and the
government debt-GDP ratio is falling over time (move from B to Eo). Over
time, the government can Lhus afford to cut taxes.
5 Adjustment costs for investment
One of the disturbing features of the models presented so faz is that they
imply a constant mazket rate of interest. This may be unrealistic, as the
experience ofthe 1980s suggests that a rise in the debt-GDP ratio leads to a
rise in the interest rate. One way of remedying thia problem is to allow for
adjuatment costs for investment (cf. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1990). This
meane that the representative firm solves:
Max~~{BK(v) - (1 } ~(I(v)~K(v))]I(v)}exp[- I r(u)du]dv (7')
subject to K(t) - I(t) - 6K(t), where I(t) denotes private investment and
the cost of adjuatment is proportional to the ratio of groas investment to
capital. For simplicity, the effects oflearning by doing and aocial infrastruc-
ture on production aze not considered here (a - 0, y- 1). This yields the
familiar first-order conditiona: 1} 2~(I~K) - q and
[r } 6 - (9~q)I4 - 9 } m(I~K)~ (17)
where q denotes the value of capital to the firm (Tobin's "Q"). Hence,
the marginal coat of adjusting the capital stock plus the cost of investment
muat equal Tobin's "Qr. In addition, the rental charge plus the depreciation
charge minua capital gains on equity ahould equal the mazginal productivity
of capital plus the marginal reduction in adjustment coats arising from an
additional unit of capital. If one either considera the case of a zero birth rate
or, more generally, the case of a time-invaziant government debt-GDP ratio,
c and thua m,r and q are time-invariant. Making use of the relationship





If there aze no costs of adjustment (m - 0), the rate of interest is constant
(r - B- 6). If there are costs of adjustment, it is easy to show that (18)
defines a negative relationship between the mazket rate of intereat and the
endogenoue growth rate as long as firms do not make lossea. The intuition is
that a higher interest rate depresaes Tobin's "Q" and the ratio of inveatment
to capital and thus reducea the growth rate. Since from (18) r - B- 6 when
x--(n -~ 6), it follows that the rate of interest is always less than B- ë as
long as x~ -(n .} 6). The relationship (18) is portrayed as the production
locus in Figure 4. The consumption locus comes from (12) and is given by:
x-o(r-P)- ~ 1-9-(ófxfn)IB ~ (19)
(n -1- a)Ia f oP f (1 - o)r)~~~~ ~~
There is a positive relation between the real intereat rate and the growth
rate. The main point that follows from Figure 4 is that the presence of
adjustment costs for investment (m ~ 0) shifta the equilibrium from Eo to Ez
and thus implies a lower rate of endogenous growth and a lower market rate
of intereat. This result is independent of whether Ricazdian debt neutrality
holda or not and suggests that effotts to reduce costs of adjustment for
investment improve growth prospects.
Insert: FIGURE 4: Adjustment costs for inveatment and the burden of debt
As long as there is a positive birth rate, tax-financed increasea in the ratios of
government debt and government consumption to national income ahift up
the consumption locus in Figure 4. When there aze no costa of adjuatment
for investment (~ - 0), the rate of growth falle but the market rate of
intereat ia unaffected (cf. the analysis of Sedion 3). However, i[ there are
costs ofadjustment for investment, the equilibrium ehifts from Ez to E3 and
there is an increase in the real rate ofintereat.15
6 Distortionary taxation
So far, it has been aesumed that all taxea aze levied in a lump-sum fashion.
In practice taxes aze levied on income and it is ofsome interest to inveatigate
the distortions arising from levying income rather than lump-sum taxes to
finance government consumption and social infrastructure. I)etailed analyeia
of the eRecte of dietortionary taxation on economic growth may be found in
Newbery (1990) and IIarro and Sala-i-Martin ( 1990) t. As far as producers
are concerned, they maximise, instead of ( 7), the preaent value of after-tax
revenues, (1-r)Y, net ofinvestment, I. In symmetricequilibrium the rental
chazge plus the depreciation charge muat then equal the after-tax mazginal
productivity of capital:
r - (1 - r)ry(Bsa)~ - á (8')
where r denotea the tax rate. Equations (12)-(14) and the capital-output
ratio k, are unaffected, except that the market rate of intereat is given by
(8') rathet than (8). The Harrod-Romer rule, (14), ia unaffected, but the
Ramsey-Romer rule becomes
x- 0~(1 - r)7(Bea)~ - ó- P) (15')
whilst the Blanchazd-Romer rule is (16) with y replaced by (1 - r)y.
Firat consider an economy with no government debt (d - 0). This meana
that the shaze of social infrastructure ia equal to the tax rate minus what
is needed for government consumption, a- r- g. Upon subatitution into
the RR rule ( 15'), one noticea a trade-off: on the one hand one needa a
low tax rate to minimise distortions and not depresa the after-tax marginal
productivity of capital too much but on the other hand one needs a high
rBarro and Salri-Mutin ehow that lump-eum taxation ie superior to income laxation
if social infrastructure conaiete of publicly-provided private goode, which ue rival and
excludable, or of pubGcly-provided public goode, whicó arc noo-rival and non-ezcludable.
They argae, however, that maet social inírastrudarc u sobject to congeetion and thua
mneiste of rival and to some degree non-ezcladable pablic goode. Since income tax then
acte ae a aser [ee, it diminiahee congeetion and can be euperior to a lamp-eam tax. The
preeent psper focusee nevertheleae on pablicly-provided privste goode.16
tax rate in order to finance a high share of social infrastructure and thue
raise the marginal productivity of capital and growth prospects. These two
effects lead to the hump-shaped relation between growth rates and tax rates
depicted in Figure 5. The level ofthe tax rate that correaponds to a ma~cimal
rate of economic growth, r' - a}(1 - a)g, increases with the fraction of
national income spent on public consumption. The corresponding growth-
maximising shaze of social infrastructure, ~' - a(1 - g), decreases with the
ehare of public consumption. The maximal growth rate itself also decreases
with the share of resources used for public consumption:
x' - 0{(1 - a)ry[B(1 - g)aa]1 - 6 - p}. (20)
The reason ie, of course, that more public consumption means more dis-
tortionary taxation and thus less growth, even if there is no entry of new
non-intergenerationally linked households. It is easy to show that, as long
as public consumption is of the "hole-in-the-ground" variety and does not
affect social welfare, mauimising growth corresponds to maximieing the
consumption-GDP ratio as well and thus to maximieing social welfare. If
the share of social infrastructure is optimal, s' - a(1- g), then the private
and aocial returna on investment coincide if the tax rate is zero and leazning
by doing is absent, ry- 1. In practice, there are spillovers of knowledge
and distortionary taxes are required to finance government expenditure, so
the growth rate in a decentralised mazket economy is too low from a social
point of view. An efficient outcome can be obtained with a lump-sum tax.
Insert: FIGURE 5: Endogenous growth and distortionary taxation
Now consider an economy with government debt. Even when there is a
zero birth rate or a fully operational intergenerational bequeat motive (p -
0), the presence of distortionary taxes destroys Ricardian debt neutrality.
The point is that an intertemporal shift in taxation, say a cut in the tax rate
followed by subsequent increases in the tax rate, increases the current growth
rate and reduces the current private consumption-GDP ratio but reduces
future growth rates and increases tuture private consumption-GDP ratios.
When the elasticity of intertemporal substitution equale unity, changes in
the tax rate do not affect the growth-corrected interest rate (r - x - p).
However, if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is less than unity,17
a cut in the current tax rate induces an increase in the current growth-
conected real interest rate and thus requires greater increases in future tax
ratea. Consequently, when the elasticity of substitution is less than unity
a current tax cut must be assotiated with greater increases in future tax
rates than when the elasticity of intertemporal substitution equals unity.
The converse holds when the elasticity of intertemporal substitution exceeds
unity.
7 Concluding remarks
So far, models ofendogenous growth have modified theinfinite-horizon Ram-
sey model of economic growth to allow for constant returns to scale with
respect to a broad measure of the capital atock. It is of extreme practi-
cal importance to be able to asaess the consequences of budgetary policies
for the growth rate of the economy. However, the previous literature on
endogenoua growth restricts itself to modela in which Ricardian debt neu-
trality holds, so that budgetary policies can only affect economic growth in
aa faz as they affect the marginal productivity of private capital. In order
to assess the effects of budgetary policiea, other than spending on social
infrastructure (including training and RBtD), on growth, it is essential to
relax debt neutrality and move to a world populated by individuals without
a fully operative, intergenerational bequest motive. This paper has there-
fore analysed the effects of budgetary policies within the context of a model
of overlapping generations and endogenous growth. Specific attention has
been paid to the effecta of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, the
population growth rate, the death rate, costs of adjuetment for investment,
distortionary taxation, learning by doing, social infrastructure, government
consumption and intertemporal shifts in taxation. There are three distor-
tions which cause the equilibrium growth rate to be less than the modified
golden rule: (i) the presence of leazning by doing and spill-overs of knowl-
edge from one firm to another firm (production externalities); (ii) the entry
of new non-intergenerationally linked households thtough either population
growth or death (consumption externalities); and (iii) the effect of social
infrastructure on production (under-provision of publicly-provided goods).
A tax-financed increase in the government consumption-GDP ratio leads
in general to less than 10001o crowding out of the private consumption-GDP
ratio. The resulting fall in the shaze of private investment induces a fall
in the growth rate. However, for the apecial case of a zero birth rate and18
Ricazdian debt neutrality, the growth rate ie unaffected and the increase
in government conaumption is fully off-set by the fall in private consump-
tion. A cut in taxes followed by eubeequent increasee in taxation ae the
government debt risea over time do not affect private consumption or the
growth rate when the birth rate is zero. However, in general, the cut in
current taxea leads on impact to an increase in private conaumption, as fu-
tnre taxes aze partially shouldered by future, yet unborn generations, whicó
leavea less resourcea for investment and savings and consequently reduces
the growth rate of the economy. Subsequently, the ratios of government
debt and private consumption to national income increase and the growth
rate continues to fall until the new equilibrium is reached. It follows that a
bond-financed increase in government consumption leads to a much greater
fall in the growth rate than a tax-financed increase in government consump-
tion. The costs of government debt and government consumption can be
substantial, and much lazger than has been suggeated by the more conven-
tional models of overlapping generations and exogenous growth in which
there is no reduction in the growth rate of the economy. An increase in
the share of social infraatructure raises the marginal productivity of capital
and unambiguously increases growth prospects in a world in which Ricar-
dian debt neutrality holds. However, if there is a positive birth rate and no
intergenerational bequest motive, the effects of an increase in infrastructure
on growth are attenuated.
An important finding is that an increase in population growth reduces
the rate of per-capita growth and thus does not lead to a 100Q1o increase in
the growth rate of national income. This is in aharp contrast with classical
growth theory, where the rate of growth of the economy equals the sum of
population Rrowth and an ~xoRenous rate of labour-auRmentinR technical
progresa. In the etandard liamsey-Romer world an increase in population
growth also leada to an identical increase in the growth rate of the economy.
One important extension is to incorporate adjuatment costa for invest-
ment, because then the mazket rate of intereat becomes endogenous and
increases when the ratios of government debt or govemment consumption
to output increase. The mere preaence of adjustment costs reducea inter-
est rates and growth rates. Another important extension is to allow for
distortionary taxation. This destroys debt neutrality, even if there is no
entry of generationa of new households, and allowa one to determine the
optimal shaze of social infrastructure and the growth rate of the economy
as a decreasing function of the shaze of government consumption.
There are three interesting directiona of future reseazch. The first is to19
investigate the effects of monetary growth on inflation and the real growth
rate. Whcn thcre is Ricardian debt neutrality, money will bc super-neutral.
However, in general, an increase in monetazy growth reduces holdinge of
real money balances and private wealth and thus increases the real growth
rate. It is thus possible that an increase in monetazy growth is not fully
reflected in an increase in inflation. The second direction ie concerned with
the effects of budgetary policies on endogenous growth in an interdependent
world economy with overlapping generations. There will be strong interna-
tional externalities in a world with integrated financial mazkets, so that the
growth rate will be determined by the budgetary stances of all countries.
Such an analysis allows one to address the issue of why the growth rates of
poor countries,in the absence of global policy intervention, do not neces-
sarily catch up with those ot rich countries. The final direction is empirical
work to investigate the empirical significance of the effects of learning by
doing, government debt, government consumption, government infrastruc-
ture, distortionary taxation and monetary growth on the growth rate of the
economy. All of this provides an exciting agenda for future research.
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Appendix: Physical capital and knowledge
flere we present a model which pays explicit attention to investment in
physical capital and investment in knowledge or ideaa. The model is based on
King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988) and Bean (1989) and, for simplicity, ignores
social infrastructure and leazning by doing. Attention is restricted to Cobb-
Douglas technologies, although thie is not necessary. The only thing that is
required is that production exhibits conetant returns to ecale with respect to
the stock of physical capital (K) and the stock of ideas or knowledge (H).
The production function is Y- B~(MK)a(NH)1-', 0 G o G 1, where
M and N denote the fractions of the physical capital stock and the stock
of knowledge that are used in the production of goods and B1i denotes a
shock to technology. Physical capital depreciates at a constant rate ó. The
accumulation of ideas satisfies
H- B~((1 - M)K)"((1 - N)H)1-a - ÁH, 0 G a G 1,
where 6 denotes the rate of "memory lossr and B2 is a shock to new ideas.
Firms maximise the present value of net revenues,
J~[Y(v) - K(v) - àK(v)]exp[- I r(u)du]dv.
This yields M- N,r ~ 6- Bia(H~K)r-a and r} 6- Bz(1 - o)(K~H)o,
where use has been made of the result that the opportunity cost of ideas
must equal Br~Bz. It follows that H~K - (~) (~), so that the market
rate of interest is given by r -(9~o)(Bz(1 - a))1-a - 6. Substitution into
the Ramsey rule yields the following rate of growth:
w- o[(Bio)a(Bs(1 - a))1-Q - ó- P]-F n.
It is straightforward to extend this class of modela with constant returns to
scale with respect to a broad measure of capital to allow for different tech-
nologies and different depreciation rates for physical capital and knowledge.Diacuasion Paper Series, CentER, Tilburg University, The Netherlands:
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